




To endure for all time or to change with the times? The Supreme Court  
and the Second Amendment 
 
Abstract 
In District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), the US Supreme Court ruled for the first time that 
the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms.  Gun rights supporters and 
conservative legal scholars hailed the decision as a triumph of originalism, the legal 
methodology which emphasises the importance of founding era history to constitutional 
interpretation.  This article argues that, far from a triumph, Heller exposed the weaknesses of 
originalism in Second Amendment interpretation.  The subsequent historical debate, 
inconsistencies within Heller itself, and the alternative approach offered in dissent by Justice 




















In June 2008, the US Supreme Court handed down its decision in District of Columbia v. 
Heller, ruling for the first time that the Second Amendment to the US Constitution 
guaranteed an individual right to bear arms for the purposes of self-defence.  Gun rights 
activists responded with joy that a majority of the Justices had endorsed a reading of the 
Amendment that they had advocated for nearly three decades. Gun control supporters 
expressed disappointment at the Court’s ruling, which struck down what were the strictest 
gun laws in the nation, but also argued that Heller offered support for their position too.  In 
fact, both leading presidential candidates, John McCain and Barack Obama, publicly offered 
their support for Heller (Balz and Richburg, 2008).  How could both sides in the seemingly 
Manichaean debate between greater gun rights and greater gun control claim support from the 
same ruling?  Because, in reality, Heller offered something to both sides.  While finding the 
Amendment protected an individual right to own firearms separate from militia participation, 
the Court also clearly stated that right was not unlimited and offered what one commentator 
called a “laundry list” of regulations on gun ownership and use that remained acceptable 
under the Second Amendment (Winkler, 2009: 1564).  Thus in answering one question (the 
scope of the right protected by the Amendment), the Court’s ruling in Heller offered up an 
array of others (exactly what regulations were permitted), guaranteeing continued debate 
about guns in American society that ensured the Second Amendment would remain relevant 
well into the 21st Century. 
 
Heller also presented, in stark terms, a clash between two competing theories of 
constitutional interpretation: originalism versus living constitutionalism.  Justice Antonin 
Scalia, who wrote for the five Justice majority in Heller, described the ruling as the greatest 





conservatives could criticise the liberal, individual-rights rulings of the Warren Court, 
originalists argued that the meaning of the Constitution should be found by seeking the 
“intent” of those who created it.  Objecting to what they saw as activist judges ignoring the 
words and meaning of the Constitution in favour of writing their own personal policy 
preferences into law, advocates offered originalism as a method of restraining the judiciary 
and “returning” the Constitution to the meaning intended by the Founding Fathers.  Scholarly 
criticism of the methods of original intent led to the development of what has come to be 
known as “original public meaning,” the version of originalism found in Heller.  The 
approach places less emphasis on the intentions of those who created the Constitution and 
more on the way in which the provisions would have been understood by ordinary eighteenth 
century Americans.  Judges remain constrained by the historical meaning of the constitutional 
provision, but without the methodological difficulties that inhered in original intent.   
 
Originalism is offered as an alternative to what is commonly referred to as “living 
constitutionalism.”  A broad umbrella term which encompasses many differing 
methodologies, advocates generally adhere to Chief Justice John Marshall’s 1819 statement 
in McCulloch v. Maryland that the Constitution was “intended to endure for ages to come 
and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs” (407).  To remain 
relevant, advocates assert, the words and phrases of the Constitution must be understood in 
their contemporary, not their historical, context.  Guided by history, precedent, legislative 
action, scholarly works, and public opinion, living constitutionalism, advocates assert, is a 
framework for ensuring a document created more than two centuries ago does not become 
obsolete through irrelevance: a strong Constitution must change with the times.  In Heller, the 






Despite the complexity of the ruling, Heller has been hailed, particularly by conservatives, as 
a triumph of originalism.1  Such claims appear based in large part on the fact that both Justice 
Antonin Scalia for the majority and Justice John Paul Stevens for the dissenters made 
extensive use of history and historical sources to build a case for their respective readings of 
the Second Amendment.  That oral argument was dominated by discussions of the late 
eighteenth century, that Scalia, the long-time advocate of originalism on the Court, wrote the 
majority opinion, and that Stevens, not usually considered an originalist, responded on 
originalist grounds all supported the claim of originalism’s success.  But, in fact, Heller was 
not a triumph of Second Amendment originalism, nor even close to a triumph.  It cannot be 
for three reasons that this chapter will explore.  First, the history and historical methods of 
both the majority and the dissent have been subject to extensive criticism from historians and 
legal scholars alike.  Second, the majority was inconsistent in its application of history to gun 
control laws, suggesting at the very least that original public meaning cannot answer every 
question raised by a Second Amendment challenge.  And third, the largely overlooked dissent 
filed by Justice Stephen Breyer indicated that at least one alternative jurisprudential 
philosophy can effectively stand against the originalist approach. 
 
Heller and History 
Original public meaning relies heavily on history and historical discussion dominated Scalia 
and Stevens’ opinions in Heller.  But historians and legal scholars have not been reticent in 
criticising the history employed by both the majority and the dissent.  Stevens’ historical 
readings have been variously described as “historically false or patently nonsensical,” 
“nonsense on stilts,” “pseudointellectual gibberish,” (Kates, 2009: 1226-7) “idiosyncratic,” 
“stingy [and] irrelevant,” (Malcolm, 2009: 1383, 1385) and “fantastical academic constructs” 





parlor trick,” (Cornell, 2008: 626) “historical ventriloquism,” (Cornell, 2011: 301) 
“methodologically irregular,” (Siegel, 2009: 1416) full of “logical flaws and inconsistencies,” 
(Winkler, 2008: 1551) as presenting a “Salvador Dali-like historical landscape,” (Cornell, 
2013: 740) and like “Bach played on a kazoo” (Cornell, 2008: 632).  Away from the 
colourful criticisms, however, a veritable cottage industry of Second Amendment scholarship 
with a historical focus has developed, sometimes to further illuminate our understanding of 
the issue of gun ownership and regulation in the early Republic, sometimes to praise or 
criticise a particular historical interpretation.  Scholars themselves cannot seem to agree on 
whose interpretation has the most support.  Don Kates (2009: 1231), one of the lawyers 
involved in the Heller litigation, argued in 2009 that “the overwhelming conclusion of legal 
and historical writers is that the Second Amendment preserves the right of all responsible, 
law-abiding adults to be armed for the defense of themselves, their homes and their families.”  
Legal scholar Cass Sunstein (2008: 255) noted, however, that “many historians have 
concluded and even insisted that the Second Amendment did not create an individual right to 
use guns for non-military purposes.”2 
 
Little of the relevant history remains without discussion in some form, but for those not 
steeped in the history of the early American nation, the literature is both overwhelming and 
seemingly inconclusive. Scholarly studies have followed the template established by Scalia 
and Stevens in Heller and sought the “proper” meaning of key Second Amendment phrases 
“the people,” “arms,” and “keep and bear arms,” providing contradictory readings while 
criticising the historical understanding of those with whom they disagree.  Others have 
fundamentally disagreed, as did Scalia and Stevens, about the proper role and understanding 
of preambles generally and the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause (“A well regulated 





Century legal interpretation.  In addition, a variety of different readings have been offered of 
the meaning and relevance of state constitutional requirements both contemporaneous with 
and subsequent to ratification of the Second Amendment; the drafting history of the Second 
Amendment and the relative importance of language ultimately discarded by the First 
Congress; the exemption of Quakers and the debate over conscientious objection; the 
Pennsylvania Constitution; English common law; and 19th Century sources in understanding 
the meaning of the Second Amendment.3  And yet there are no clear or obvious conclusions 
to be drawn from this voluminous history, except perhaps for Richard Schragger’s 2008 
observation that “the meaning of the Second Amendment is complicated,” (283) which, while 
accurate, provides little guidance in navigating through the proffered alternative readings.  
What this complexity does offer, however, is a major challenge to those who claim Heller 
was a triumph of originalism.  If history is to play a major role in interpreting constitutional 
provisions, the debate among the Justices and within subsequent scholarship suggests the 
question of which history has yet to be discovered or decided. 
 
A second major challenge to originalism, offered primarily by historians, is that the history 
employed by originalists does not meet the rigorous methodological requirements of 
professional history but is instead “law office history”.4  Such history has been defined as “a 
results oriented methodology in which evidence is selectively gathered and interpreted to 
produce a preordained conclusion” (Cornell, 2009: 1098).  “There is a marked difference,” 
Sunstein (2008: 256) wrote, “between the care, sensitivity to context, and relative neutrality 
generally shown by historians and the advocacy-oriented, conclusion-driven, and often 
tendentious treatments characteristic of academic lawyers ....”  Criticisms of history used by 
lawyers and legal scholars as ideologically motivated or selectively chosen are not new, nor 





prevalent in Second Amendment scholarship.5  In 2008, Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm 
praised Scalia’s “carefully reasoned and scholarly opinion,” which “painstakingly assessed 
both favorable and unfavorable historical evidence,” while criticising Stevens for 
“disregard[ing] inconvenient facts and employ[ing] linguistic devices that distort the plain 
meaning of the original text” (1378).  Saul Cornell has been arguably the most prolific and 
frequent critic of the Heller majority, and originalists generally, for their reading of early 
American history.6  Criticising one group or another for participating in law office history has 
similarities to claiming that those same individuals are misreading history: it seeks to 
delegitimize the conclusions reached.  In the latter, it does so by claiming those conclusions 
are wrong, in the former by holding that the methods employed are not sound.  That the 
criticisms are aimed at all sides in the debates fundamentally weakens any claim for the 
“triumph” of originalism in Heller.  If the history offered by lawyers and employed by the 
Justices in their opinions is all equally tainted by claims of results-orientation then the biggest 
loser of all is the methodology that encourages and draws on that history.   
 
One need not be an expert in early American history, however, to see the problems inherent 
in originalism: the opinions in Heller exposed them clearly.  Absent the restraint of 
significant precedent, the Justices were able to write on “as near a clean slate as modern 
constitutional law presents,” (Greenhouse, 2008: 307) which only made more stark the 
limitations of originalism, at least on its own terms.  The biggest problem, so clear to 
historians, is that the original meaning sought by originalists does not and cannot exist.  
While it is possible to criticise the methodology and readings of the history employed by 
Scalia and Stevens in their respective opinions, their clash of views revealed the fundamental 
problem of originalism, one which most historians would recognise: even using similar 





about the events portrayed in those sources.  When those individuals start using different 
sources and employing methodologies which weight those sources differently then the 
possibility of different outcomes increases exponentially.  Thus Scalia and Stevens might 
both be equally correct in their readings, just as they might be equally wrong, but both are 
reasonable understandings of the history revealed in their sources.   
 
This is because history at its best is a work of interpretation.  Historians, unlike law office 
historians, generally do not pick and choose their sources according to their preferred 
outcomes nor do they deliberately seek to reinforce a political agenda with the history they 
write.  But historians do bring their own beliefs, experiences, opinions, and personalities to 
what they do, and with those things come choices, about which sources to trust, which are 
more or less reliable, which are more historically significant, which were more influential or 
representative.  And such choices entail judgment, the very thing originalism claims to 
expunge from the process of judging.  Scalia and Stevens’ differing histories can be 
accounted for by differences in judgment just as much as strengths and weaknesses in their 
history.  As Mark Tushnet (2013: 168) observed: “Heller was a test for conservative 
originalists’ claim that modern originalism’s exclusive focus on historical materials would 
keep judges from advancing their policy views while pretending to interpret the Constitution.  
Originalism didn’t quite fail the test, but it got a grade of C+ or so – pretty much the grade 
you’d give every other method of constitutional interpretation.”  The fact that Scalia and 
Stevens, ostensibly both taking an originalist approach, could ultimately come to different 
conclusions about the meaning of the Second Amendment was the simplest, clearest sign of 
the most significant weakness in originalism’s methodology: historical scholarship requires 
judgment and, because of that, there is no “correct” or “true” history to be found.  To the 





prevents or limits judicial judgment, therefore, they seek something nonexistent.  The danger 
then becomes that originalism presents itself as a neutral method of judicial interpretation 
while it is, in reality, a “theory no less subject to judicial subjectivity and endless 
argumentation than any other” (Wilkinson, 2009: 256). 
 
Inconsistency and the Majority 
Originalists and non-originalists alike have offered a further critique of the originalism 
employed by Scalia for the majority: that it was inconsistent in addressing questions of 
possible limits to the Second Amendment right.  “Like most rights,” Scalia stated in Heller, 
“the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”  Throughout the 19th 
Century, Scalia noted, courts and commentators recognised that “the right was not a right to 
keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose” 
(626).  Yet, as noted by Justice Breyer in dissent and by many commentators since, the 
majority offered no historical support for these exemptions.7  After more than fifty pages of 
historical discussion of the meaning of the Second Amendment the lack of any such 
discussion on this point was notable and Scalia’s defence, that in the first case considering 
such a major issue not all possible areas of controversy could be discussed in detail, failed to 
address the inconsistency.  The founding era offered many examples of gun regulations that 
the majority could have referenced.  Scalia’s opinion dismissed those offered by Breyer as of 
minimal relevance but, those aside, the scholarly literature offered additional examples that 
the majority might have used as colonial era analogues of the modern gun control laws they 
found acceptable.8  At the very least, the principle of regulations on gun ownership had been 
established.  From an originalist perspective, however, such examples were problematic in 
that none offered direct equivalents to those listed in the majority opinion; making 





that originalists decry.  But providing no historical evidence for those limits accepted by the 
majority also contradicted an originalist approach and created an anomaly within the Heller 
majority opinion. 
 
A second area of controversy has been the inconsistent treatment of handguns in the majority 
opinion.  Reading the Court’s own 1939 precedent, US v. Miller, as permitting restrictions on 
certain types of weapons, the Heller majority accepted that such a limitation “is fairly 
supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual 
weapons.”  Thus, the weapons protected by the Second Amendment were those “in common 
use at the time” (627).  Yet in discussing the specifics of the District’s law later in the 
opinion, the majority noted, “handguns are the most popular weapons chosen by Americans 
for self-defense in the home” (629).  The majority’s language, the context of the discussion, 
and the lack of any historical references in this section combined to give the impression that 
this was a judgment based not on colonial era self-defence but on 21st Century choices.  As 
Adam Winkler (2009: 1560) commented, “Scalia looks to the fickle dynamics of 
contemporary consumer choices.  Handguns are protected because people today choose 
handguns for protection.”  In an opinion so self-consciously originalist, which criticised both 
dissents for poor history and a lack of proper historical grounding, the majority’s apparent 
reliance upon current public opinion rather than historical understanding was jarring.  The 
decision to follow, if not to actually make, a policy choice about the types of weapons 
protected under the Second Amendment potentially implied that the entire historical reading 
offered earlier in the opinion was equally influenced by policy choices.  The lack of historical 
evidence and the apparent influence of contemporary decisions by ordinary Americans 







The majority’s defence of gun regulations can be explained by a number of factors, all of 
which speak to the general working of the Court.  First, remembering Justice William 
Brennan’s “rule of five,” it is possible that the language was inserted to gain or keep the five-
Justice majority.9 While Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas had been consistent advocates 
for an originalist perspective, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and 
Anthony Kennedy often looked to other sources and may not have been entirely convinced by 
an entirely originalist argument.10   Second, the comments can be read as a response to the 
dissenters’ concerns about the potential dangers of an unlimited right to gun ownership 
(Henigan, 2009: 1196; Wilkinson, 2009: 273, 281).  Challenged by claims that the Court’s 
ruling would lead to inconsistent decisions, policy-making by judges, and increased danger to 
law-abiding Americans, the majority sought to defend their approach and dispel such claims 
by indicating the limits to the scope of their holding.  Third, the majority’s discussion of 
handguns in particular spoke to the importance of stare decisis in light of the reference to 
Miller.  Scalia (1989) had previously stated that he believed precedent might offer an 
acceptable exception to an originalist reading of a constitutional provision.  Recognising that 
certain types of weapons may be eligible for regulation (and by implication, others may not) 
fitted with Scalia’s own judicial philosophy.  Fourth is the question of public legitimacy.  The 
exact relationship between public opinion and the Supreme Court is unclear but most scholars 
agree that the Court is rarely out of line with public opinion for long and the Justices are 
aware that the Court’s institutional legitimacy is threatened when making decisions which 
challenge public opinion.11  Studies suggest that most Americans support both an individual 
right to own guns for self-defence and reasonable gun regulations (Jones, 2008; Pew 
Research Center, 2008; Washington Post, 2008); thus a ruling challenging either of these 





influence in the most effective way, might judge that conceding on the issue of reasonable, 
already-existing regulations while pressing a preferred reading of the broad right in general, 
might offer the best way to ensure continued legitimacy and the opportunity to revisit the 
issue at a later date.  Or, in the words of one commentator, “the originalists on the Court had 
to sell their originalist souls to survive” (Winkler, 2009: 1565). 
 
To Court scholars all of these explanations for the apparent contradiction between the self-
confessed originalism of the majority’s approach and the acceptance of certain kinds of limits 
on gun ownership are reasonable; each speaks to an accepted understanding of the way in 
which the Court operates.  In the context of Heller, however, the fact is that all of them 
undermine any claim to a “triumph of originalism.”  Concessions to keep a majority, to 
maintain public support, to address or limit criticisms from dissenters, or to recognise the 
importance of stare decisis or other jurisprudential considerations, ensured the majority won 
the battle to define the overarching right embodied in the Second Amendment, but none of 
them rested on an historical interpretation of the original public meaning of the scope of the 
Second Amendment.  Thus while Heller offered a showcase of what originalism could 
achieve, it also revealed clearly its limitations. 
 
Justice Breyer and the Living Constitution 
Nothing shows how dominant has been the view that the importance of Heller lay in its 
originalism than the almost complete absence of any significant discussion of Justice 
Breyer’s dissent.  Linda Greenhouse, former Supreme Court correspondent for the New York 
Times, noted this absence in 2009, offering her own interpretation of Breyer’s opinion as a 
“mea culpa” for giving “short shrift” to the opinion in her initial coverage for the Times 





the debate about Heller, drowned out by “the titanic clash of the competing historical 
visions” offered by Scalia and Stevens (Greenhouse, 2008: 299).  The reasons for this are 
unclear.  Breyer’s opinion, at forty-four pages, was only marginally shorter than Stevens’ 
dissent (forty-six pages) and was certainly no less detailed or effectively argued.  It directly 
addressed and criticised the majority’s approach and offered alternative readings of key state 
provisions in terms of early American gun control legislation, criticisms to which Scalia 
responded.  In addition, Breyer was seen as Scalia’s most frequent sparring partner on and off 
the Court in regards to methods of constitutional interpretation.  The battle between the two 
was noted and commentated upon, making it all the stranger that its continuation in the pages 
of Heller has been so under-explored (Lithwick, 2006; Young, 2010; Seabrook, 2011). 
 
One hint comes in Jeffrey Toobin’s 2012 study of the Roberts Court.  Writing about Heller, 
he commented, “It was left to Breyer to write the kind of dissent that the justices used to 
produce” (112).  From this perspective, the dominance of originalism in the majority opinion 
in particular was unusual and noteworthy, the first time the Court had so clearly and heavily 
made use of history to interpret a major provision of the Constitution; by contrast, Breyer’s 
approach represented something older, something more familiar, and therefore less striking.  
It is certainly true that Breyer’s jurisprudence was a version of living constitutionalism.  The 
general failure to address Breyer’s Heller dissent may, therefore, be a simple case that 
familiarity breeds contempt.  But this significantly underestimates the importance of Breyer’s 
particular approach to living constitutionalism and its role in Heller.  In his dissent, Breyer 
offered a clear, compelling alternative way of understanding the Court’s role in interpreting 
the Second Amendment and a critique of some of originalism’s weaknesses, while also 
showing that living constitutionalism had not disappeared from the Court’s jurisprudential 






Like Scalia, Breyer began his opinion with history.  His understanding, however, differed 
from that of the majority.  Colonial history, he wrote, “offers important examples of the kinds 
of gun regulation that citizens would then have thought compatible with the ‘right to keep 
and bear arms’” (683).  Boston, Philadelphia, and New York, Breyer noted, all had laws 
restricting the discharge of firearms within the city limits; in effect, laws governing the use of 
guns in urban areas.  This would become crucial later in his opinion.  In addition, several 
towns and cities regulated the storage of gunpowder for fire safety reasons.  This had 
relevance for the District’s law in two particular ways according to Breyer.  First, it prevented 
individuals from keeping loaded weapons in the house to use immediately against an intruder.  
Second, it prevented individuals carrying their guns in the city, unless they had no intention 
of entering a building or were willing to unload their weapon before going inside.12  
Dismissed by the majority as of minor relevance, Breyer’s argument was not that these laws 
were exact analogues of the District’s law but that they established, in principle, the fact that 
Americans of the colonial era were familiar with laws that burdened in several ways their 
ability to use and carry firearms, at home or in public.13  Such laws might, as in the case of 
gunpowder storage, be motivated by concerns for public safety, indicating that any right to 
gun ownership was tempered by concerns for public welfare.  Thus Breyer, as well as 
Stevens, offered a reading of history which challenged that offered by the majority.  But for 
Breyer, history was not dispositive, it was only the beginning, not the end of the discussion.  
Having established that some restrictions on Second Amendment rights might be permissible, 
the question was at what point the acceptable became unconstitutional. 
  
Assessing constitutionality according to Breyer required a balancing of interests, “with the 





concerns on the other, the only question being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly 
burdens the former in the course of advancing the latter” (689).  Far from being a novel 
approach to constitutional interpretation, the balancing of interests has traditionally been the 
way the Court has resolved such disputes.14  Breyer, then, followed more closely than the 
majority the Court’s traditional path for adjudicating constitutional disputes.  “[I]mportant 
interests lie on both sides of the constitutional equation,” (689) Breyer argued, offering in 
advance a challenge to critics who might be tempted to claim his approach failed to take 
seriously Second Amendment rights.  Crucially, however, Breyer argued that more than 
simply Second Amendment rights were at stake and worthy of consideration.   
 
In his 2005 book, Active Liberty, Breyer emphasised the importance of “the freedom of the 
individual citizen to participate in the government and thereby to share with others the right 
to make or control the nation’s public acts” (3).  The views of the people, as expressed 
through their legislatures, are entitled to respect in a democratic system.  While that does not 
mean the Court should always defer to legislative judgments, it does mean their views are 
entitled to a degree of consideration when their actions are challenged.  “The majority’s view 
cannot be correct unless it can show that the District’s regulation is unreasonable or 
inappropriate in Second Amendment terms.  This the majority cannot do,” Breyer asserted in 
Heller (681).  Presenting in some detail statistical evidence on gun deaths and gun crime, 
Breyer showed the extent of the problem identified by the District.  Discussing statistics on 
gun deaths generally, and accidental death and deaths of children in particular, as well as 
figures about gun crime in urban areas, Breyer presented the District’s law as a reasonable, 
common sense response to a growing problem.   Recognising that debate existed about 
whether gun regulation actually reduced gun crime and gun death, Breyer nevertheless noted, 





guns], drop by drop.  And none of the studies can show that effort is not worthwhile.”  
Indeed, not only did the studies fail to show the worth of the attempt, “they do not by 
themselves show that those judgments are incorrect ...” (703).  While the statistics quoted by 
Breyer presented a picture of needless, tragic loss, his primary aim was to support his 
understanding of proper constitutional interpretation: “legislators, not judges, have primary 
responsibility for drawing policy conclusions from empirical fact.  And, given that 
constitutional allocation of decisionmaking responsibility, the empirical evidence presented 
here is sufficient to allow a judge to reach a firm legal conclusion.”15  Because the legislative 
judgment was based on a reasonable (even if not necessarily correct) interpretation of the 
information available to it, that judgment was entitled to considerable weight when judging 
the law’s constitutionality. 
  
With his emphasis on public safety concerns, Breyer also drew on a constitutional 
understanding at least as old as the Second Amendment.  Under the federal system, states 
maintained responsibility for protecting the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens: the 
so-called police powers of the states.16  Long-recognised by the Court, police powers 
justifications offered a legitimate state interest, worthy of consideration.  The role of police 
powers was evident in Breyer’s discussion of the statistics considered by the District in 
passing the challenged law but was even clearer in his analysis of whether the burdens placed 
on individuals’ self-defence rights by that law were the least-restrictive and proportionate to 
the aims sought.  “[T]he very attributes that make handguns particularly useful for self-
defense are also what make them particularly dangerous,” Breyer observed.  As a result, 
“although there may be less restrictive, less effective substitutes for an outright ban, there is 
no less restrictive equivalent of an outright ban” (711-12).  The District had reasonably 





use of handguns and thus had sought to regulate that access and use; the District’s interest in 
protecting the lives and safety of its citizens was legitimate; an alternative law could not 
achieve the same level of protection as the one passed by the District; thus, by implication, an 
alternative law would not permit the District to meet its police powers obligation.  If taking 
police powers seriously the law should stand since it represented both a reasonable judgment 
and the only way in which the District’s aims could be fully met and its duties fully 
discharged. 
 
Breyer’s opinion thus offered a significant challenge to both the outcome and the 
methodology of the majority.  That he was only able to convince three colleagues to join him 
in Heller should not detract from the importance of his approach. Recognising the importance 
of the history of the founding era, Breyer nevertheless rejected undue deference to that 
history.  The history he did provide supported the fact revealed by a comparison of the 
opinions of the majority and Stevens: that history may be read in many different ways and 
thus originalism’s claim as a neutral method of constitutional interpretation could not be 
supported.  Breyer made clear, however, that history should only be part of the enquiry, and 
not necessarily the definitive part.  Instead, Breyer argued, the role of the Court was to 
balance the competing interests before it: the rights of citizens protected by the Second 
Amendment against the right and duty of states to protect their citizens under their police 
powers.  In judging the correct balance, deference was due to the historical scope of the right 
but also to the policy decisions of democratically-elected legislatures in light of the evidence 
available to them. Acknowledging such an approach required an element of judicial 
judgment, Breyer nevertheless rejected the majority’s characterisation of his approach as 
“judge-empowering” by asserting the limits placed on such judgment.  In fact, he argued, his 





value of particular historical sources and debates without clearly showing either that they 
were doing so or why and who failed to provide any reasoning justified by their own methods 
for the gun regulations they accepted.  Breyer thus offered both a critique of originalist 
methodology and a workable alternative approach that the Court could follow in future cases.  
Whether or not Breyer is able to convince his colleagues to adopt his approach at some future 
point, his contribution to the debate demands more attention than it has to date received.   
 
Conclusion 
Frustrating gun rights supporters who saw in Heller an understanding of the Second 
Amendment that would free gun owners from most, if not all restrictions, lower courts have 
largely borne out Scalia’s observation that Second Amendment rights are not unlimited.  By 
March 2015, more than nine hundred gun-related cases had been heard at state and federal 
level and, while not all gun control laws survived the challenge, the vast majority were 
upheld by the courts (Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, 2015).  Significantly for 
originalism, most regulations were upheld under the “common use” doctrine or the list of 
possible exceptions offered by the Heller majority.  Courts have shown little interest in 
following the historical approach to the Second Amendment laid out in Heller or the Supreme 
Court’s 2010 ruling in McDonald v. Chicago which applied the earlier ruling to the states 
(Rostron, 2012: 709).  The combination of heavy reliance on the non-originalist part of Heller 
and the relative absence of historical enquiry by lower courts challenges a reading of Heller 
as a triumph of originalism, suggesting instead that history remains only one of a number of 
factors taken into consideration by courts when assessing Second Amendment claims.17    
The Supreme Court’s subsequent absence from the debate, rejecting review, as of the time of 
writing, in all Second Amendment cases since McDonald, in effect, permitted the 






Heller was thus not the triumph of originalism that many claimed it to be.  The conflicting 
histories offered by Scalia and Stevens revealed that originalism could not do what its 
advocates claimed and offer a way of understanding the Second Amendment free from 
judicial judgment.  The fundamental nature of historical scholarship made this impossible.  
Thus the originalists in the majority failed to be clear about the judgments they were making 
and offered, at best, only partial explanations for their reasoning.  The failure of lower courts 
to make extensive use of Heller’s originalist reading suggests the competing interpretations 
of Second Amendment history offered by Scalia and Stevens served only to confuse rather 
than clarify.  Scalia’s majority opinion, with its inconsistent use of history and failure to 
provide historical support for either its favouring of handguns or for regulations on gun 
ownership, indicated that originalism alone could not address all contemporary Second 
Amendment concerns. In addition, the focus on originalism overlooks Breyer’s contribution 
to the debate which shows that there is a debate to be had, legally and politically.  Legally, 
Breyer offered an alternative way to approach constitutional interpretation generally and 
Second Amendment jurisprudence specifically.  And, as ongoing debates in the nation’s 
legislatures show, the exact meaning of the Second Amendment remains an open question to 
be further explored: Heller did not and cannot end the debate.  Gun rights and gun control 
supporters both point to the Constitution and to Heller in support of their position.  Given 
this, the Second Amendment’s relevance for 21st Century debates about guns and American 
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